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His analysis continued to the conclusion that the indirect approach is always superior to the direct approach, and had wider applicability -a law of life in all spheres, a truth of philosophy. According to Liddell Hart, "the indirect approach is as fundamental to the realm at politics as to the realm of sex". 3 Does the theory of indirect approach stand scrutiny? Is it possible to defeat an industrialized nation without committing mass on mass, Liddell Hart states that the purpose of strategy is to diminish the 6 V.E. Tarrant, The U-Boat Offensive, Press, Annapolis, 1989) 44.
V.E. Tarrant, 44. 1914 Tarrant, 44. -1945 (Naval Institute possibility of resistance, seeking to fulfill this purpose by exploiting the elements of movement and surprise. 8 In this vein, Germany did not notify the neutral governments of the change in the nature of the submarine campaign until the day before it commenced. Simultaneous disclosure and prosecution would be the best way "to achieve the psychological effect on the population of Britain and the deterrent effect on the neutral powers which was an essential factor in the whole plan". 9
Liddell Hart articulates the aim of strategy as "not so much to seek battle as to seek a strategic situation so advantageous that if it does not in itself produce the decision, its continuation by a battle is sure to achieve this". I° Acknowledging the threat of the United States, the German General Staff was confident that the U-Boats could starve Britain into submission before U.S.
troops could arrive in numbers sufficient to affect the situation on the Western Front. In fact, the German Navy was so confident of success in its campaign against shipping that it anticipated being able to prevent the arrival of American troops in Europe in any significant numbers. 11
Liddell Hart stipulates that strategic dislocation is the aim of strategy; it is physically achieved by upsetting the enemy's dispositions and by compelling a change of front; separating an opponent's forces; endangering an opponent's supplies; and menacing his lines of retreat. Psychologically it is achieved by inducing the feeling of being trapped. 12 Within the time frame
February -April 1917, 1.9 million tons of Allied and neutral shipping went to the bottom; one of every four ships that left Britain was sunk; Britain was replacing one ship for every ten sunk; wheat supplies in Britain went down to Liddell Hart, 323.
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V.E. Tarrant, 45. First, while the American entry into the war was necessarily slow in having any military impact, the unexpected rapid mobilization of American shipyards, and the release of 500,000 tons of enemy shipping held in U.S. ports, were wholly unanticipated in the German calculus:
the economic impact of America's entry in the war was badly miscalculated, and no counterweight was or could be devised, s° No less disastrously, no attempt was made by the Imperial Navy to go after U.S. troop transports, although this had been part of the German strategic design at the start of the campaign. 21
Second, the return of sufficient shipping to trade in summer 1917 enabled
Britain to survive while U.S. mobilization and the benefits of the convoy system took effect because "The need for the neutrals to continue to trade despite the German campaign was a factor in their return to British ports, but critical to their doing so was the intense political and economic pressure to which the neutrals were subjected, not to mention the lucrative financial inducements offered by Britain and the United States". 22
No counter diplomatic offensive was launched by Germany to dissuade the neutrals or provide alternative trade, and, indeed, such alternatives were beyond German reach. There is much to be said for the view that German failure in this campaign stemmed from a more fundamental flaw in the German conduct of war than one specific concept of operations, and it may well be that a campaign could never have been prosecuted to a successful conclusion for various, specific, naval reasons -such as the difficulty in conducting a stern chase against maritime resources that displayed a flexibility that could never have been anticipated before the event.
But it is hard to resist the conclusion that the theory of indirect approach is flawed for the following reasons: a) despite acknowledging that fighting power Is just one of the instruments of strategy, Liddell Hart does not treat the coordination of economic, diplomatic, or ethical initiatives with the attainment of indirect military force objectives; b) maneuver warfare does not remove standing armies in the field; It may cause strategic disruption, and it may tempt the strategist to try and achieve victory on the cheap, but the economy of force may, prove to be a false economy; c) the indirect approach places undue-emphasis on the ability to Impact the will of the people. A complex industrial society, threatened with national survival, and exposed to unspeakable hardship and privation will harden their will as the stakes for victory increase.
The unrestricted U-Boat campaign of [1917] [1918] demonstrates that all elements of the strategic equation (force structure, doctrine, economics, diplomacy, and moral suasion) must be coordinated to achieve the strategic objective, whether approached directly or indirectly. Its outcome contradicts Liddell Hart's contention that the indirect approach is always superior to the direct approach. Nonetheless, as a strategic failure, it was a near thing.
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